Dictionary of Arguments

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Relations, philosophy: relations are that what can be discovered or produced in objects or states when compared to other objects or other states with regard to a selected property. For example, dimensional differences between objects A and B, which are placed into a linguistic order with the expression "larger" or "smaller" as a link, are determinations of relations which exist between the objects. Identity or equality is not accepted as a relation by most authors. See also space, time, order, categories, reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
III 84f
Relations/Order/Stages/Universals/Armstrong: Laws of Nature/LoN: second order relation between universals - if it is a law of nature that Fs are Gs: between F-ness and G-ness: non-logical, contingent necessity Notation: N(F,G) it follows: (x)(Fx>Gx), but not vice versa (also simple regularity without necessity possible) - Lewis: if two universals are in relation and this relation is in relation to a regularity, then there is a link to this regularity - This second link is an entailment - question: is regularity part of the relation? then it is a surplus above the regularity - Form: (P&Q)>P(P = regularity) - Alternative: P>(PvQ): Armstrong pro. But how can that be forced into the form N(F,G)>(x)(Fx>Gx)?
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Martin II 128
Logical relations: cannot exist between separate entities - causal relations: only between separate ones.
Martin II 133
Armstrong: this principle results, in turn, from the idea that absolute necessity arises only from identity - MartinVs: here you must keep a close eye on the range of the examples.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-12-10
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