Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Regularity, philosophy: regularity. The expression is usually used in connection with considerations of causality. The question is whether the determination of regularities is sufficient for the formulation of laws of nature. Opponents of the regularity theory demand that, in addition to the observation of positive cases, a formal determination is made on cases that have not yet occurred. For this purpose, e.g. a counterfactual conditional is established. E.g. if A were the case, then B would be the case, assuming that case A did not (yet) occur. See also causation, law of nature, laws, counterfactual conditional, unreal conditional clauses, cause, effect, induction._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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R. Chisholm on Regularities - Dictionary of Arguments
II 42/43 Regularity of the world/Hume: both the belief in a uniform and in a non-uniform world (in which the predictions fail) refer to a contingent state of affairs of reality - hence no logical proof - empiricism, in turn, requires regularity - for the regularity thesis itself it can never be ascertained whether it leads to success or failure. Rutte: one who believes in universal regularity must proceed through guessing. Who guesses does not believe in regularities but in a method for success. Contradiction! II 45 Regularity of the world/Rutte: a belief in it should be maintained - but a transition to it is not methodologically justifiable. >Methods, >Justification. Rutte, Heiner. Mitteilungen über Wahrheit und Basis empirischer Erkenntnis, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Wahrnehmungs- und Außenweltproblems. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |