|Rules, philosophy: rules are restrictions of a domain of possibilities for subjects, communities or functionaries, or generally for acting individuals or groups. Rules may be implicit or explicit, and may be implemented by ordinance or by jointly developing equally authorized participants, e.g. in a discourse. In another sense, rules can be understood as actual regularities that can be discovered by observation. These rules can be discovered not only in action, but also in the nature of objects such as linguistic structures. See also norms, values, rule following, private language, language rules, discourse, ethics, morality, cognitivism, intuitionism, society, practice.|
Books on Amazon
Rules only exist within a practice, which is maintained by the fact that the parties are in agreement.
Rules/Wittgenstein/Wright: whatever Wittgenstein's dialectic exactly achieves it forces in any case some kind of restriction for a realistic idea of rules and meaning.
And therefore also for truth, because truth is a function of meaning.
Rule-following/Wright: shows that judgments about meanings and that what corresponds to these conditionally, are withdrawn from cognitive coercion. And then the same must also apply to claims about the truth of sentences.
This intuitive reasoning is therefore not a trivial solipsism and the ghost of a global minimalism (Boghossian) is still among us.
Rule-following/Wright: in the three other areas of discourse (without evidence transcendence as in mathematics) however, it appears that they are biased by considerations to rule consequences.
These considerations may
1. prevent the formulation itself, and prevent that the problem appears solvable at all
2. discover misconceptions, presented jointly by the opponents,
3. affect the result from the outset in favor of minimalism.
4. Difficulty: how can we achieve the desired realism of objectivity, if our response to a problem will never be able to free itself from a dependence on skills and aptitudes to spontaneous reactions whose own state is drawn into doubt with respect to objectivity.
Fort VI 55ff
WrightVsDavidson: Cognitive bid, language, meaning, truth and knowledge would collapse if there is no offense in relation to what we call "addition".
EMD II 225
Rules/Wright: not in the same language - exception: as an expression of what someone understands when he understnads "red": can be formulated in the same language - chess: not from the inside/(s) otherwise learnable by observation - then never certain whether these are all rules, or if not in reality quite different rules - prevailing view/hS/Wright: that rules can be recognized from the inside out: WrightVs: would demand that language use can be explained as an application of rules - then excludes to see it at the same time as a game (as actually desired).
EMD II 226
Rules/vagueness/Wright: problem when applying predicates which should be guided by rules: then in the case of vagueness simultaneous application and non-application prescribed when overlapping.
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989