|Rules, philosophy: rules are restrictions of a domain of possibilities for subjects, communities or functionaries, or generally for acting individuals or groups. Rules may be implicit or explicit, and may be implemented by ordinance or by jointly developing equally authorized participants, e.g. in a discourse. In another sense, rules can be understood as actual regularities that can be discovered by observation. These rules can be discovered not only in action, but also in the nature of objects such as linguistic structures. See also norms, values, rule following, private language, language rules, discourse, ethics, morality, cognitivism, intuitionism, society, practice._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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|Wright I 287
Addition/arithmetic/Wittgenstein stigmatizes an "ideal-rigid machine" or a "philosophical superlative" of the rules, namely the idea that such a purely conceptual unity and disunity are not based in an ontological way on facts that lie in human nature.
Wright: better: we have to allow that such things are fixedly determined in a way that people might in principle not realize but that they still leave room for the idea that their constitution itself is somehow dependent upon the changing circumstances in the context of sub-cognitive abilities of people.
Newen/Schrenk I 32
Rules/Wittgenstein: (use theory): rules are central, because the use is usually very stable.
Hintikka I 242
Rules/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: middle period: Problem: rules must not become a "central entity" - Blue Book: Rules are not mere drill - instead: the rule is incorporated in the understanding, obeying, etc. - later Vs: Problem: that leads to regress. - Later: Philosophical Investigations §§ 143-242: to follow a rule is analog to following a command.
Rules/language game/language/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: language games take precedence over rules.
Rule/music/Wittgenstein: the rule neither exists in the result of playing, nor in the result plus score. - But in the intention to play the score - the rule is included in all individual cases - it cannot be isolated, therefore.
Rule/reality/world/Wittgenstein: a rule is not in relation to the reality so that we could see if they match or not - we make the grammar of color words not according to the model of reality - otherwise you could say: "these properties have this kind of grammar" - applicable rules for "red", etc. are not to be justified by anything that can be said about colors.
Rule/Wittgenstein: contradictions exist between rules - not between a rule and the reality.
Meaning/rule/ostensive definition/Wittgenstein: a (single) rule is not sufficient to indicate the meaning - such a rule would be given by an ostensive definition - therefore an ostensive definition is not a definition - not sufficient: E.g. "This is soz" - solution:. sufficient: "This color is soz" it must be clear for what kind of thing the word stands - N.B.: differentia/genus: problem: how can we decide what the genus is?
Rule/Law of Natural/Wittgenstein: Rules are not rigid as laws of nature (NG) - natural laws: are independent of us.
Rule/Wittgenstein: no prohibition or permission - no statement._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001
G. H. von Wright
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996