Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Rules, philosophy: rules are restrictions of a domain of possibilities for subjects, communities or functionaries, or generally for acting individuals or groups. Rules may be implicit or explicit, and may be implemented by ordinance or by jointly developing equally authorized participants, e.g. in a discourse. In another sense, rules can be understood as actual regularities that can be discovered by observation. These rules can be discovered not only in action, but also in the nature of objects such as linguistic structures. See also norms, values, rule following, private language, language rules, discourse, ethics, morality, cognitivism, intuitionism, society, practice.
 
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Wright:
Rule sequences/Kripke: In Wittgenstein "skeptical paradox": negates any possibility of rules and meanings containing real limitations.
At the end remains the attempt to keep afloat with the Charybdis.
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Wright I 264
McDowellVsKripke: Error, the destruction of the Scylla (Platonism, divine standpoint) is to be understood as the logical core of the dispute over rules. In reality, the destruction is merely a logical sentence.
McDowell: Wittgenstein’s concern was to show that both horns are based on an inflated conception of fact and objectivity.
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Wright I 264 ff
Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Wright: "Skeptical Paradox": Step 1: Debate on any apparent assertion, e.g. that I formally meant addition when I said "+" in the past. Then I have defended this against a skeptic. Now one should conclude that, even if I lost this fight, no conclusion about the reality of meanings, rules, and so on would be foreseeable. So the epistemology of assertions about meaning would be no more understandable under the pressure of skepticism than the epistemology of the past or of the material world or the minds of others are still.
But that would be a mistake! E.g. In attempting to justify that I meant addition with "+" in the past, I am granted complete reproduction of all aspects of my mental life. All relevant facts would have to show in my behavior and my mental life, and therefore be graspable by me.
Now if I lose anyway, it becomes apparent that there are no such facts.
Wright: In the argument, no over-objectification of the nature appears as a premise! The only assumption: that facts about my previous meanings must have appeared in my behavior.
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Wright I 264 ff
WrightVsKripke: But that is vulnerable: However, it is not a mistake of sublimation of the rules (raise to a higher level). If anything is unprotected against the skeptical paradox, then a humanized Platonism is no less so than the over-objectified version.
Quietism/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Wright: Is definitely obliged to quietism: because realism (that there are no facts regarding any rules) must be inflated to a comprehensive irrealism.
An irrealism of the meaning must therefore trigger an irrealism of the truth.
Global Minimalism/WrightVs: that’s deceptive simplicity! Properly considered, the result of the irrealism based on Kripke’s skeptical paradox is that the discourse on rules is minimally capable of being true, at most.
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Wright I 264 ff.
Kripke’s Wittgenstein: no behavior allows conclusions on internal rules (in the past) about addition, therefore these are also no rules about meaning, not even in the present, therefore also not on truth as well!

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-25