|Reference, philosophy: reference means a) the relation between an expression and one or more objects, thus the reference or b) the object (reference object) itself. Terminological confusion arises easily because the author, to whom this term ultimately goes back - G. Frege - spoke of meaning (in the sense of "pointing at something"). Reference is therefore often referred to as Fregean meaning in contrast to the Fregean sense, which describes what we call meaning today. See also meaning, sense, intension, extension.|
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|Meggle I 297
According to Hungerland:
Strawson: reference rules - rules of presupposition of expressions such as e.g. "the President of the United States is ... years old".
Meggle I 297
Strawson: Lies are no correct use of language.
Meggle I 310f
1. To refer does not mean that you say you refer to something.
2. The thing must stand in a certain relation to the speaker.
3. The correct reference is not part of the utterance, in the sense in which a proper description is part of what is asserted by the utterance.
E.g. "This is black and that is white." Here is the fact that "this" is closer to me than "that" not part of the statement!, Not part of what I said about the two objects.
- - -
Meggle I 311
Reference/Strawson: not saying that one "refers to something" - R is not part of the utterance as the correct description of the statement is.
Hungry country, "this" is closer to me than "that", but not part of the statement - "S" does not require that there is only one, but that I am only referring to one.
Strawson III 436
Reference/Strawson: a) clearly referring expressions: the fulfillment of the conditions is not stated but implied - b) descriptive terms: here the fulfillment of the conditions is also stated by the use.
Reference/Strawson: on particular without reference to properties possible.
Identification/reference/Strawson: E.g. "That man there has crossed the channel twice in swimming through it" - it has the (wrong) appearance, that one "refers twice", a) once by stating nothing and consequently making no statement, or b) identifying the person with oneself and finding a trivial identity. StrawsonVs: this is the same mistake as to believe that the object would be the meaning of the expression - E.g. "Scott is Scott".
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Grice: > Meg I
G. Meggle (Hg)
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979