Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Reference, philosophy: reference means a) the relation between an expression and one or more objects, thus the reference or b) the object (reference object) itself. Terminological confusion arises easily because the author, to whom this term ultimately goes back - G. Frege - spoke of meaning (in the sense of "pointing at something"). Reference is therefore often referred to as Fregean meaning in contrast to the Fregean sense, which describes what we call meaning today. See also meaning, sense, intension, extension. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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P.F. Strawson on Reference - Dictionary of Arguments
Meggle I 297 According to Hungerland: Strawson: reference rules - rules of presupposition of expressions such as e.g. "the President of the United States is ... years old". Meggle I 297 Strawson: Lies are no correct use of language. Meggle I 310f Reference rules/Strawson: 1. To refer does not mean that you say you refer to something. 2. The thing must stand in a certain relation to the speaker. 3. The correct reference is not part of the utterance, in the sense in which a proper description is part of what is asserted by the utterance. E.g. "This is black and that is white." Here is the fact that "this" is closer to me than "that" not part of the statement!, Not part of what I said about the two objects. Meggle I 311 Reference/Strawson: not saying that one "refers to something" - R is not part of the utterance as the correct description of the statement is. Meggle I 312 Hungry country, "this" is closer to me than "that", but not part of the statement - "S" does not require that there is only one, but that I am only referring to one. --- Schulte III 436 Reference/Strawson: a) clearly referring expressions: the fulfillment of the conditions is not stated but implied b) descriptive terms: here the fulfillment of the conditions is also stated by the use. --- IV 68 Reference/Strawson: on particular without reference to properties possible. --- VII 124 Identification/reference/Strawson: E.g. "That man there has crossed the channel twice in swimming through it". - It has the (wrong) appearance, that one "refers twice", a) once by stating nothing and consequently making no statement, or b) identifying the person with oneself and finding a trivial identity. StrawsonVs: this is the same mistake as to believe that the object would be the meaning of the expression - E.g. "Scott is Scott". >Waverley example._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice: > Meg I G. Meggle (Hg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979 Schulte I J. Schulte Wittgenstein Stuttgart 2001 Schulte II J. Schulte U. J. Wenzel Was ist ein philosophisches Problem? Frankfurt 2001 Schulte III Joachim Schulte "Peter Frederick Strawson" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke, Reinbek 1993 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20