Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Reference, philosophy: reference means a) the relation between an expression and one or more objects, thus the reference or b) the object (reference object) itself. Terminological confusion arises easily because the author, to whom this term ultimately goes back - G. Frege - spoke of meaning (in the sense of "pointing at something"). Reference is therefore often referred to as Fregean meaning in contrast to the Fregean sense, which describes what we call meaning today. See also meaning, sense, intension, extension.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
I 177
Proposition/Sentence/Truth/knowledge/Identification/Evans: (1982, 31) E.g. Julius is the (rigid) name of the inventor of the zipper (whoever it was) - then "Julius was born in Minsk" expresses a particular proposition about a particular individual, but we do not know who the individual is - i.e. we do not know what proposition is expressed by the sentence.
I 180f
Reference/Stalnaker: we have two images about language and thinking, repsectively, about an object: a) directly by virtue of a causal relation (>Kripke) - b) indirectly through our sensing (>Frege) and expressions of purely qualitative terms that are instantiated by certain things (IT) - Does this lead to essentialism in Kripke’s opinion? - SearleVsMill: -direct Reference- (without intermediary sense) leads into a metaphysical trap: separation of object and properties. - Solution/Stalnaker: properly understood, it is about the modal properties of a thing. - ((s) could have been different).

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-26