Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Reference, philosophy: reference means a) the relation between an expression and one or more objects, thus the reference or b) the object (reference object) itself. Terminological confusion arises easily because the author, to whom this term ultimately goes back - G. Frege - spoke of meaning (in the sense of "pointing at something"). Reference is therefore often referred to as Fregean meaning in contrast to the Fregean sense, which describes what we call meaning today. See also meaning, sense, intension, extension.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
II 289
Reference/Searle: linguistic reference always comes from intellectual terms.
II 313f
Names/Meaning/Reference/Searle: E.g. Goedel/Schmidt: intentional content determines reference: "discoverer, no matter whatever his name is" - we are talking about the person who has been recognized by their contemporaries - e.g. exchanged stains: identification: "the stain which causes the experience "- variant forgetting: "the one I was previously able to identify as A".
II 316
Twin Earth/Reference/Searle: Reference cannot rely on descriptive content, our names still refer to our domestic objects, when the perceptual situation is unchanged - SearleVsPutnam: causal self-referentiality is sufficient.

J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Reference

> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX Datei
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-27