|Reference, philosophy: reference means a) the relation between an expression and one or more objects, thus the reference or b) the object (reference object) itself. Terminological confusion arises easily because the author, to whom this term ultimately goes back - G. Frege - spoke of meaning (in the sense of "pointing at something"). Reference is therefore often referred to as Fregean meaning in contrast to the Fregean sense, which describes what we call meaning today. See also meaning, sense, intension, extension.|
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Reference: for each distinction between referees of expressions one needs some ontological categories, anything, even coarse to tailor the things.
RortyVsPutnam, RortyVsKripke: If the concept of "really talk about" is confused with the concept of reference, one can easily get the idea like Kripke and Putnam that we had "intuitions" about the reference.
Of course, there can be no reference to fictions. This corresponds to the technical-scientific use. But then "reference" has nothing to do with "talk about", and only comes into play after you have made a choice between the interpretive strategies.
Real questions of existence are also not affected by the criterion of Searle and Strawson. What is then the right criterion? Rorty: there is none at all.
For Davidsons ’pure’ philosophy of language neither one nor the other is necessary.
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Horwich I 450
Reference/Davidson: is a byproduct of the translation - reference/Kripke: causation must have something to do with reference - Reference/Strawson: you find out what somebody is referring to by finding out for what most of his beliefs are true. - RI: reconciles the two approaches: Strawson right when he is understood holistically. - Quine: middle position between Kripke and Strawson: knowledge of causation and reference is a matter of the coherence of the beliefs of the natives and the field linguists. - Kripke: modular approach: causal paths of objects to speech acts - then all beliefs can also be wrong - That means that one does not know what one is referring to. - DavidsonVsKripke: this is precisely the gap between conceptual scheme and content. - Solution/Davidson: reversed: first maximize coherence and truth, then reference as a byproduct - then it can be as it likes! - Important argument: This ensures that in the most direct cases the intentional objects are the causes of the beliefs - the Gödel-Schmitt case must then be an exception. - I 451 otherwise the term of reference had no content. - (like analytical). RI/DavidsonVsKripke: works if we know most of the intentional objects of the native. - RI begins at home: we assume for ourselves and for the native that most beliefs are true - (I 452 that requires no causality!) - then we have to reject intermediate links "the determined meaning" or "intended interpretation", "imaginations". - Meaning/belief/Quine/Davidson: cannot be found out independently of one another.
Rorty I 323
Reference Theory/PutnamVscausal reference theory/Putnam/Rorty: a "causal" reference theory cannot help: - because the question of how the term "cause" can clearly refer to something is just as enigmatic as the question of how the term "cat" can do it.
Reference/Reference Theory/Putnam/Rorty: early: only causal theory of reference - not intentional - can spare us from relativism. - ((s) later: non-intentional theory does not explain learning.)
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994