|Reference, philosophy: reference means a) the relation between an expression and one or more objects, thus the reference or b) the object (reference object) itself. Terminological confusion arises easily because the author, to whom this term ultimately goes back - G. Frege - spoke of meaning (in the sense of "pointing at something"). Reference is therefore often referred to as Fregean meaning in contrast to the Fregean sense, which describes what we call meaning today. See also meaning, sense, intension, extension.|
_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
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|Rorty I 219f
Quine: inscrutability of reference: not talking of what the objects of a theory are in an absolute sense is useful, but the question of how a theory of objects can be interpreted or re-interpreted in another one. E.g. How can you find out if someone sees everything upside down, or in complementary colors? It makes sense to talk about subordinate theories, but only relative to the theoretical framework with its own preliminarily appropriated and ultimately inscrutable ontology.
Hartry FieldVsQuine: has shown that Quine’s talk of "relativization to a background language," and of "taking the reference literally" is not consistent with his general reasoning.
RortyVsQuine: a real holism would consider the question "are we referring in reality to rabbit or rabbit parts? To formulas or to Goedel numbers" neither meaningless nor meaningful only relative to a background language, but in reality to be a question such as " Are we are really talking about nations or groups of individual persons?" "Are we talking about witches or hallucinations?" These questions make sense if we give them meaning. That means that something else depends on their answer.
Quine I 273
Shared reference: Terms, not objects! - Nevertheless, it is water, which is spread - mass terms: cumulative reference, (grammatically like singular term) - singular term: shared reference.
Opaque verb: "hunts lions" puts nothing in relation, does not refer to a lion - relative term police chasing a man.
Theories and things:
Prerequisite of an object not the same as reference, but same motivation - Fido-Fido principle: individual chairs mostly nameless, "chair" refers to virtually any chair.
Reference: comes out through the predication: it is the same in dogs and milk: Milk is white, Fifi is a dog - But: milk and dog cannot be. compare II 13f.
Inscrutability of reference: there is no difference: "x is a dog" or "x is the St-strand, which is filled by a dog" - only statement about the terminology used and its translation, not physical object (proxy function). - inscrutability: in translation or permutation.
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Putnam II 194
Reference/Quine: there are definitely true and false sentences, but no specific reference relation - reason: the true sentences have an infinite number of models, and there is not the one designated model (Loewenheim) - in various true models, there are then various reference relations.
Quine I 129
Translation: translatable: observation sentences, truth functions (conjunction, negation, alternation) - identifiable: stimulus analytic sentences, stimulus-synonymous occasion sentences of the natives - untranslatable: stimulus-synonymous occasion sentences.
Reference/Theory of reference/th.o.r./Quine: name, truth, denotation (designating ("true-by")), extension, values of variables, ontological commitments - theory of reference includes the semantic paradoxes.
Reference/Extension/Singular term/General Term/Follesdal/Lauener: singular term: have a reference - general term and sentences have an extension._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990