Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Reference, philosophy: reference means a) the relation between an expression and one or more objects, thus the reference or b) the object (reference object) itself. Terminological confusion arises easily because the author, to whom this term ultimately goes back - G. Frege - spoke of meaning (in the sense of "pointing at something"). Reference is therefore often referred to as Fregean meaning in contrast to the Fregean sense, which describes what we call meaning today. See also meaning, sense, intension, extension.


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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 395
Theory of reference/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: might refute that - (but not a theory of meaning).
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Putnam III 52f
Counterfactual Conditional/reference/Representation/Fodor: Thesis: to explain the actual nature of the reference by means of counterfactual conditionals. Asymmetric dependence - Cat token expressions are triggered by cats, but also by many other things.
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III 54
Reference by causal attachment to the world. So also through images and mockups. - If not by cats, then not by pictures of cats.
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III 56
Then (counterfactual) law: pictures of cats trigger "cat". - N.B.: ultimately dependent on real cats.
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III 57 Fodor: if not pictures, then also not cats as a trigger. - PutnamVs.
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III 61
Reference/Hermeneutics: there cannot be necessary and sufficient conditions for the reference of a word to individual x - FodorVs. that leads to meaning-holism, which in turn is followed by a meaning-nihilism.
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III 64
PutnamVs: E.g. witch, perhaps analytically female, nonetheless there are no necessary and sufficient conditions for "witch". - A witch-law would be wrong because of non-existence - because there is no world with witches - however, appropriate counterfactual conditionals could be true. - N.B.: their truth is not explained by the law. - (Armstrong: anyway vice versa).
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III 65
PutnamVsFodor: for correct asymmetric dependence (the word through the trigger) this counterfactual conditional has to be wrong: if conmen cannot trigger any statement, then soldiers cannot either.
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III 69
Reference/PutnamVsFodor: previous speech behavior of previous generations is a contributing cause - otherwise "backward law": false: if cats do not trigger, then there is also no previous behavior - but right vice versa - (but only if the cause is interpreted as a causal factor). - FodorVs: its causality underlies the colloquial cause-term (direct response? behaviouristic?) - PutnamVs: that is interest-relative.
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III 78
Reference/PutnamVsFodor: cannot reduce them with the help of the terms law, counterfactual conditionals, causality.
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III 133
Reference/Fodor. according to Quine's criticism of the inscrutability of reference: individual sciences or everyday language causality.
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III 140
Refernce: the fundamental physics, cannot explain the possibility of referring to something or the assertion of something. It cannot even do it when it comes to their own territory.
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III 208
Reference: from the fact that some words do not refer without causal link it does not follow that reference itself would be causal. - It is only subject to causal restrictions.
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V 75
Reference: Thesis: Input is shaped by concepts. - There are no inputs that allow only a single description that would be independent of all conceptual decisions.
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V 79
Reference/externalism: (external, divine position): Problem: what actually is reference - Reference cannot be causal because "alien" always refers to aliens.
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I 34
Reference: if it is fixed, you can come up with any theories on the subject.
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I 35
Physical broadband concepts such as size and cause allow also to formulate failed markings - Kripke: then names are usable without having true beliefs about the referent.
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I 65
Reference: in logic: that what corresponds to the description - Field: has shown that this does not fulfill the task.
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I 67ff
Primitive Reference/Putnam: E.g. creatures that can distinguish 17 properties and number them: "Pee-sevunteen-this" (sic): in fact, feelings of the beings themselves - amounts to causal theory of reference - when expanded to absent, past, future objects not necessary and sufficient conditions are introduced.
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I 69
Semantic rise: one day the mass introduces the concept of a reference: "Uk-ook reefur-this" (sic) - that would not be our reference, otherwise paradoxes arise. - It only becomes a correct language with quantifiers - N.B.: with quantifiers the causal connection between X and the reference to X is dissolved.
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I 70
Field: Tarski has shown how reference to primitive reference (show plus noise) can be traced back. - +> Gricean intention> Intention.
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Rorty I 312
(According to Rorty):
Putnam: a "causal" theory of reference cannot help: because the question of how the term "cause" can clearly relate to something is just as mysterious as the question, how the term "cat" has done this.
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Rorty IV 20 ff
Rorty: relation/Putnam: early: only causal theory of reference (not intentional). Can save us from relativism.
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Rorty VI 123
Rorty: causal theory of reference: PutnamVsKripke, also self-criticism on earlier writings: The description of the causal relationships between a something and other things is nothing more than the description of characteristics that neither in a greater nor lesser extent stand in an "intrinsic" or "extrinsic" relationship. So also the feature "to be described by a human being". PutnamVsSearle: Vsdifferentiation "Intrinsic"/"relational".

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-23