Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Reference, philosophy: reference means a) the relation between an expression and one or more objects, thus the reference or b) the object (reference object) itself. Terminological confusion arises easily because the author, to whom this term ultimately goes back - G. Frege - spoke of meaning (in the sense of "pointing at something"). Reference is therefore often referred to as Fregean meaning in contrast to the Fregean sense, which describes what we call meaning today. See also meaning, sense, intension, extension.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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Books on Amazon
Horwich I 437
Elite classes/nature/natural reference/world/language/Lewis/Putnam: thesis: there are certain classes of things -out there- (elite classes) which are intrinsically different, while it is a natural condition for reference (integrated in nature) that as many of our concepts as possible should refer to these elite classes. - PutnamVs: that’s spooky.
Schwarz I 149
New theory of reference/Putnam: Reference has nothing to do with associated description - so pain might actually be joy. (Kripke ditto) - LewisVsPutnam: Solution: Role: pain cannot play the role of Joy.
Schwarz I 217
Reference/description theory of reference/Lewis: Thesis: expressions such as possible worlds, meanings, pain, objective probability are associated with roles that determine what they refer to.
Putnam II 195 f
Reference/Lewis: is a functional property. (See property/Put) - Important argument: to be distinguished in physical/non-physical - Reference is then a functional property of the organism-plus-environment system - then the commonality of references is just as abstract as a program, but does not require any fundamental quantities. - PutnamVsLewis: Reference is no functional property, no causality or causality is nothing physical. - (> Charles Fried)

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-11-23