Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Reference, philosophy: reference means a) the relation between an expression and one or more objects, thus the reference or b) the object (reference object) itself. Terminological confusion arises easily because the author, to whom this term ultimately goes back - G. Frege - spoke of meaning (in the sense of "pointing at something"). Reference is therefore often referred to as Fregean meaning in contrast to the Fregean sense, which describes what we call meaning today. See also meaning, sense, intension, extension.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data

Gareth Evans on Reference - Dictionary of Arguments

I 314ff
To mean/reference/divine standpoint/Wittgenstein/Evans: for example, someone is in love with one of two identical twins - God, if he could look into his/her head, could not tell with which of them the person is in love, if the person itself does not know in a moment. ((s) Because no additional information could be found in the mental state and in the twin.)- Evans: the (description-) theory of the mind cannot explain why erroneous descriptions cannot give the impetus.
I 325
Reference/Evans: Reference is also possible if the description is not fulfilled, but not designation.
I 328
Reference/Names/Evans: in general, we refer to the thing that is the source of the prevailing information.
I 333ff
Reference/Evans: reference is defined by information sets, not by fitting.
Frank I 22
Evans: between Frege and Perry: saves Fregean sense, but meaning = reference!
I 24ff
Meaning unequal Reference/Evans: e.g. "today": the meaning remains, the speaker changes. > "Fido"-Fido-Theory/Evans: equals the meaning and the reference: > I/Evans.
- - -
Frank I 503
EvansVsGeach/EvansVsStrawson: one aspect of the reference is to make your audience do something.

Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell,
Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Evans I
Gareth Evans
"The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993

Evans II
Gareth Evans
"Semantic Structure and Logical Form"
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976

Evans III
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2021-07-25
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