Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Reference, philosophy: reference means a) the relation between an expression and one or more objects, thus the reference or b) the object (reference object) itself. Terminological confusion arises easily because the author, to whom this term ultimately goes back - G. Frege - spoke of meaning (in the sense of "pointing at something"). Reference is therefore often referred to as Fregean meaning in contrast to the Fregean sense, which describes what we call meaning today. See also meaning, sense, intension, extension. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
M. Dummett on Reference - Dictionary of Arguments
I 41 Frege: first reference, then "sense". Trend today: for singular terms: Meaning = Reference - DummettVs: absurd in complex terms (>descriptions). I 47 Reference: words - not sentences or parts of sentences (Dummett: feeling for the language). Def reference of an expression: is that which is common to all other expressions where it is clear that their substitution instead of the original expression does not affect the truth value of any sentence in which it occurs. I 48 Frege: theory of reference prevails over theory of "sense". - "Sense" determines the reference - Husserl: Reference = "sense". Use gives meaning - sense gives reference (Frege) - meaning not equivalent to reference: e.g. unicorn RussellVs distinction sense/reference; >meaning, >reference > Fregean sense. (RussellVsFrege). - - - II 128 Reference/Frege/Dummett: does not show everything that the speaker knows when he understands an expression > sense. - Knowledge of reference is not sufficient for meaning. E.g. identity a = a is uninformative - Dummett: the same goes for every atomic sentence._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 |
||
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20