Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Reference, philosophy: reference means a) the relation between an expression and one or more objects, thus the reference or b) the object (reference object) itself. Terminological confusion arises easily because the author, to whom this term ultimately goes back - G. Frege - spoke of meaning (in the sense of "pointing at something"). Reference is therefore often referred to as Fregean meaning in contrast to the Fregean sense, which describes what we call meaning today. See also meaning, sense, intension, extension.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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I 41
Frege: first reference, then "sense".
Trend today: for singular terms: Meaning = Reference - DummettVs: absurd in complex terms (descriptions).
I 47
Reference: words - not sentences or parts of sentences (Dummett: feeling for the language).
Def reference of an expression: is that which is common to all other expressions where it is clear that their substitution instead of the original expression does not affect the truth value of any sentence in which it occurs.
I 48
Frege: theory of reference prevails over theory of "sense". - "Sense" determines the reference - Husserl: Reference = "sense".
Use gives meaning - sense gives reference (Frege) - meaning not equivalent to reference: e.g. unicorn
RussellVs distinction sense/reference (meaning/reference) (RussellVsFrege).
- - -
EMD II 128
Reference/Frege/Dummett: does not show everything that the speaker knows when he understands an expression > sense - knowledge of reference is not sufficient for meaning. E.g. identity a = a is uninformative - Dummett: the same goes for every atomic sentence.

Du I
M. Dummett
Urspr√ľnge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

> Counter arguments against Dummett
> Counter arguments in relation to Reference

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-27