Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Reference, philosophy: reference means a) the relation between an expression and one or more objects, thus the reference or b) the object (reference object) itself. Terminological confusion arises easily because the author, to whom this term ultimately goes back - G. Frege - spoke of meaning (in the sense of "pointing at something"). Reference is therefore often referred to as Fregean meaning in contrast to the Fregean sense, which describes what we call meaning today. See also meaning, sense, intension, extension.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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Frank I 386
"direct reference" / reference / Kaplan: explaines the goals of thought well (with massive propositions (Russell)) - CastanedaVs: problem: we need internal accusatives (thin propositions (traditional, Frege / Moore)). -
  I 386
doxastic accusatives / Castaneda: problem: pure universals are too far away, particularized properties or propositions are too large - Solution: Guise theory of formations: middle: particularized properties, particularized to very thin, finite individuals.

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-30