|Reference, philosophy: reference means a) the relation between an expression and one or more objects, thus the reference or b) the object (reference object) itself. Terminological confusion arises easily because the author, to whom this term ultimately goes back - G. Frege - spoke of meaning (in the sense of "pointing at something"). Reference is therefore often referred to as Fregean meaning in contrast to the Fregean sense, which describes what we call meaning today. See also meaning, sense, intension, extension.|
_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
|Frank I 386
"direct reference" / reference / Kaplan: explaines the goals of thought well (with massive propositions (Russell)) - CastanedaVs: problem: we need internal accusatives (thin propositions (traditional, Frege / Moore)). -
doxastic accusatives / Castaneda: problem: pure universals are too far away, particularized properties or propositions are too large - Solution: Guise theory of formations: middle: particularized properties, particularized to very thin, finite individuals._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994