|Reference, philosophy: reference means a) the relation between an expression and one or more objects, thus the reference or b) the object (reference object) itself. Terminological confusion arises easily because the author, to whom this term ultimately goes back - G. Frege - spoke of meaning (in the sense of "pointing at something"). Reference is therefore often referred to as Fregean meaning in contrast to the Fregean sense, which describes what we call meaning today. See also meaning, sense, intension, extension.|
_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
Grover, D. L. on Reference - Dictionary of Arguments
Horwich I 347 f
Reference/prosentential theory /Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB/Grover: a pronoun should not need to refer to a proposition - otherwise we will have a >relation theory (proposition as object of belief, CGBVs) - E.g. "..." - "that s what you believe!": Solution: prosentential anaphora: "this is wrong".- ((s) Here "this" is no pronoun)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
|Grover, D. L.
Gro I D. Grover, A Prosentential Theory of Thruth, Princeton New Jersey 1992
D. L. Grover, J L. Camp, N. D. Belnap
Philosophical Studies 27 (1) 73 – 125 (1975)
See external reference in the individual contributions.
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994