Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Reductionism, philosophy: reductionism is a collective term for attempts, to either trace back statements in a subject area to statements from a sub-area of this subject area or equating statements of a subject area with statements of another subject area. The main point here is the justification of such transfers. Reductionism in the narrower sense is the thesis that reduction is possible. Typical reductionisms exist in the domain of the philosophy of mind. See also holism, eliminativism, materialism, physicalism, functionalism.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
III 52 ff (where?)
Justification: the traditional concept of justification in epistemology is reductionistic and atomistic. >reduction.
Reductionism/Freud: he does not tell us that art is actually sublimation, that philosophical system formation is just paranoia or religion merely misguided memory.
IV 48 ff
"Anti-reductionism": reduction is no relationship between ontological categories, but only between linguistic circumstances. a) Who (linguistically) speaks of X does not necessarily speak of Y. b) Every description in an X terminology applies only to things to which also a description in a Y terminology refers. But this type of reduction does not mean that "X things are nothing but Y things".
There is nothing that could show this. "An X is what it is, and no other thing." (Buttler).
The only possibility to show that there are no X things would be to show that there are no such sentences! (X and Y only stylistic variants).
Folk Psychology: will continue to be the most appropriate way to talk about us. We will keep "beliefs" and "desires" in our vocabulary. They are proven tools.
VI 138f
Def reductionism/Rorty: there is not a single network, but also a single, privileged description of all entities included in the network. The reductionist believes that we do not only need causal unity, but also unity of explanation: A process to make all attempts at explanation commensurable and provide true nomological statements through which all these entities (thoughts, neurons, sins, hormones, actions and movements, persons and organisms) are interlinked.
RortyVsReduktionism: we have learned from Davidson to be content with token-token identities between differently described objects.
VI 139
Reductionism/Rorty: believes that there is only one correct description -" so that all explanations are comparable -

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

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> Counter arguments in relation to Reductionism

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-11-18