|Reduction, philosophy: reduction is the tracing back of a set of statements to another set of statements by rephrasing and replacing concepts of a subject domain by concepts from another subject domain. There must be conditions for the substitutability of a concept from the first domain by a concept from the second domain. An example of a reduction is the tracing back of mental concepts to physical concepts or to behavior. See also bridge laws, reductionism, translation, identity theory, materialism, physical/psychical, physicalism, eliminationism, functionalism, roles, indeterminacy._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Reduction/Schiffer: ... no more should be required than that theoretical terms (TT) are physically realized - but realization does not imply reducibility - Schiffer pro Brentano: in favour of irreducibility of the intentional vocabulary.
Eliminativism/Churchland: is quite different: intentional vocabulary is not reducible - but folk psychology (functional theory) will turn out to be wrong. - SchifferVsChurchland: why should irreducibility imply unrealizability?_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987