Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Justification, philosophy: justification is a condition for knowledge which a) is fulfilled or not fulfilled by the explanation of the origin of the information or b) by a logical examination of the argument. For a), theories such as the causal theory of knowledge or reliability theories have been developed. See also verification, examination, verification, proofs, externalism.
Justification in a broader sense is a statement about the occurrence of an action or a choice. See also explanations, ultimate justification, reasons.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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Crispin Wright on Justification - Dictionary of Arguments

I 92
History/past/Wright: It is a peculiarity of evidence for the past, which can nothing guarantee, that the currently available evidence could not be misleading due to some unfortunate circumstances.
Consequently, it applies to statements about objects and events in the present tense (present), that their justification may not be in general a reason for accepting that this will not be their fate.
Justification/Super-assertibility/Wright: the justification is therefore no unlimited reason to regard a statement as super-assertible.
Permission/Wright: thesis: the permission to state something requires the permission to look at something as super-assertible.
I 96
Justification/Wright: the belief that all evidence is not misleading, is not something for which a justification/permission must be acquired. It is an indispensable default assumption (> Default: Absence (of evidence)):
  If that is correct, the following conditional applies:
If P, then there is a favorable balance of available evidence relating to P, as long as it is finite.
Although not a priori true, but a priori justified.
  (s) Vs: something might be easily true, and all indications show the contrary. This case would not even be unusual. (E.g. Skillfully performed murder).
  Wright: that reaffirms the super-assertibility.
I 211f
Definition default relationship of the confirmation between experiences and statements. (Default: non-appearance in court, absence). E.g. "That star is of yellowish color" is a default justification, insofar as it relates to the color. An appropriate justification by experience is revocable in the context of appropriate background beliefs, but otherwise presumably valid. ((s) Unless nothing different "appears").
  Question: can one assume now cognitive deficiency with that?
  A theorist who accepts on-1, can do this either because of his ignorance of this support for Hn, or dispute the probative force while being biased.
  If there is now no other support for Hn, the adoption of Hn by the first theorists remains unjustified, and the denial in the right.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2021-07-25
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