|Justification, philosophy: justification is a condition for knowledge which a) is fulfilled or not fulfilled by the explanation of the origin of the information or b) by a logical examination of the argument. For a), theories such as the causal theory of knowledge or reliability theories have been developed. See also verification, examination, verification, proofs, externalism.|
Justification in a broader sense is a statement about the occurrence of an action or a choice. See also explanations, ultimate justification, reasons._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
|Hintikka I 264
"To use a word without justification does not mean to use it wrongly. Of course, I do not identify my feeling by criteria, but I use the same expression.
"It is to accept the everyday language game. The primitive language game taught to the child needs no justification. Words have meaning only in the flow of life. Instinct is the first, raisonnement the second. There are reasons only in a language game.
Ending/Conclusion/Inference/Wittgenstein: the conclusion is the transition from one sentence to another, a transition to the justification of which it is said, for example, that one follows the other. It is quite different from other relationships, where the opposite is always conceivable. The subsequent relationship and similar relationships are internal relationships. What justifies the conclusion is that you see the internal relationship. No final rules are needed to justify the conclusion, because otherwise one still needed a rule, infinite recourse.
Justification/Wittgenstein: a general sentence is not justified by the results, but by the reasons we can give.
Reason: no matter how far the reasons may suffice, they stop before the actual fact comes to light.
Justification/Natural Laws/Wittgenstein: Natural laws can be justified - rules of grammar cannot.
Art/Wittgenstein: what justification is there for a characteristic of an artwork? I do not agree with the answer "something else would cause the wrong effect".
The reasons are further descriptions. The aesthetics are descriptive. What it does is to draw attention to certain characteristics.
True/False/Truth Value/Wittgenstein: who uses the calculus with true and false? It has no use at all. As a calculus it is boring and useless, the same applies to Russell's calculation.
However, it has a justification that may not apply to other logics: the joke of the true/false calculus is that it provides a translation of Russell's calculus. A calculus is only of value if it helps to clarify another.
Justification/Documents/Confirmation/Mathematics/Wittgenstein: after realizing that 1000 divided by 3 must lead to 333, is it then a confirmation to calculate it? What does the claim that one calculation confirms the result of another mean?
One could describe something as a method of generating the 17th digit. The latter can be interpreted in all possible ways, but in fact we must not interpret it in all possible ways.
Evidence/Wittgenstein/Schulte: their justification comes to an end: but the end is not that certain sentences immediately make sense to us as true, like seeing, but our action, which lies at the basis of the play of language. (Wittgenstein, On Certainty, § 204).
Schulte. Because it is action, we cannot rely on a set of rules.
Our rules leave back doors open._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Merrill B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989