|Justification, philosophy: justification is a condition for knowledge which a) is fulfilled or not fulfilled by the explanation of the origin of the information or b) by a logical examination of the argument. For a), theories such as the causal theory of knowledge or reliability theories have been developed. See also verification, examination, verification, proofs, externalism.|
Justification in a broader sense is a statement about the occurrence of an action or a choice. See also explanations, ultimate justification, reasons.
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Logical space of the reasons/Logical space of nature/McDowell: Thesis: beside the space of reasons (concepts) there is a logical space of nature: of the natural laws, non-normative relations.
A) logical space of reasons: justification, knowledge, belief, functional concepts.
B) logical space of nature: objects, sense impressions.
This is not a splitting of "natural" and "normative".
Justification/Judgment/McDowell: the relations through which judgments are justified can only be understood as relations in the space of concepts (reasons).
It is one thing to be free from guilt, and another to have a justification. Free from guilt: the raw influence of causality (the effect of the world on our senses) withdraws itself from the control of spontaneity.
It is an excuse for someone if he was driven by a tornado to a place where he did not have anything to look for.
But what we want is: that the exercise of spontaneity is subject to a control exercised by the world itself, but so that the applicability of spontaneity is not undermined (by no longer being the cause of excuse).
Justification/McDowell: every concept which is now constituted by the fact that it consists in a justification relation to a merely present must be a purely private concept.
Justification/Quine: cannot be done through experience. Only by events which are subject to natural laws.
McDowellVsQuine: Contradiction: If experience is not within the order of justification, it cannot be exceeded by world views. This, however, requires "conceptual sovereignty."
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001