Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Law: law is an expression of the totality of social standards as binding norms in contrast to less binding rules and conventions. The law includes obligations as well as authorizations. In order to ensure equal treatment of the members of a society, the law is laid down in laws. See also laws, norms, values, society.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
Brocker I 670
Law/Justification/Kant: Kant's conception of the law is based on the assumption of a transcendental subject whose capacity for moral autonomy lies in the fact that it is not part of the world of appearances determined by natural laws and can therefore orient itself on the idea of generalizability, instead of acting on the basis of its tendencies, urges and desires.
Transcendental Subject/Kant: has a purely formal character in that it neither pursues certain content purposes nor has preferences.
Subjectivity/Kant: this subjectivity is free and yet individualized, as each transcendental subject relates purely to itself as a being of freedom.
RawlsVsKant: Rawls tries to reformulate Kant without these "metaphysical" (more precisely transcendental philosophical) prerequisites.
Brocker I 671
SandelVsRawls: Rawls's attempt fails because Rawls implicitly has to base his theory on a theory of the "self" that is not substantially different from Kant's theory. Kant's theory and deontological liberalism cannot be saved from the difficulties that the Kantian subject brings with it (1)
Transcendental Subject/Rawls: Rawl's "veil of ignorance" in an assumed initial state of a society to be established, in which people do not know what role they will play later, is an attempt to reconstruct Kant's transcendental subject without metaphysical assumptions. See Veil of Ignorance/Rawls.

1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), S. 14.

Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

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Höffe I 304
Law/Ultimate Justification/Kant/Höffe: [Kant declares] metaphysical convictions themselves indispensable for a theory of law and state, if it wants to be philosophical.
Höffe I 306
Kant divides his moral system, the metaphysics of morals, into two parts: the doctrine of law as the epitome of what humans owe one another, and the doctrine of virtue as the epitome of meritorious extra work.
For both he represents a general law of moral rank. In contrast to the general law of virtue, the general law of rights does not depend on the inner motive force, which is why one must obey the law of rights, but not make obeying it the maxim of one's action. The external action is sufficient for morality of the right, provided that it is considered in relation to the external actions of other persons, that is, for Kant: other sane beings.
What counts for the law is only the external cohabitation, which in moral terms must submit to a strictly general law: "Act outwardly in such a way that the free use of your arbitrariness with the freedom of everyone according to a general law could exist together"(1).
Coercion/Law/Kant: To the mere concept of law, Kant shows conclusively, belongs a power of coercion. Here, in contrast to a philosophical anarchism, Kant denies the view that there should be any coercion between people.
KantVsLocke: The morally permissible coercion does not, however, include the right to punish as in Locke's natural state; it is only the right to defend oneself against injustice. One may, for example, prevent a theft or retrieve the stolen goods, but one may neither injure the thief nor take more than what was stolen. >Property/Kant, >Rule of Law/Kant, >State/Kant.

1.Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre § C

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03
Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018

Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2021-01-16
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