Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Realism, philosophy: realism is a collective term for theories which, in principle, believe that it is possible for us to acquire knowledge about objects of the external world that is independent from us as perceptual subjects. A strong realism typically represents the thesis that it would make sense to even create hypotheses about basically unknowable objects. See also metaphysical realism, internal realism, universal realism, constructivism.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
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II 87
Realism/SearleVsNaive: is right that the material objects and experiences are the typical objects of perception. - But he overlooks the fact that they can only be it because perception has an intentional content.
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II 199
Realism/Searle: no hypothesis or belief, realism belongs to the background. I
am set to the background - Realism is a prerequisite for hypotheses - being determined to realism itself is not a hypothesis.
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III 160f
External Realism/Searle: must still differ between representation-independent (e.g. stars) and mind-independent (also stars)- e.g. pain is representation-independent but not mind-independent.
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III 165
Realism/Searle: thesis says that there is an independent reality, not about how it is designed, no theory of language, no theory of representation, but ontological.
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III 163f
Realism/Searle: should not be confused with correspondence theory, it is no theory of truth - it is a condition for our hypotheses - it is compatible with any truth theory because it is a theory of ontology and not the meaning of "true" - no semantic theory - Putnam understands realism epistemically: the realism asserts that it would be reasonable to assume a divine standpoint -SearleVsPutnam: accepting a mistake that reality determines itself what vocabulary is appropriate.
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III 165
Searle: realism is not a theory of language - VsTradition: N.B.: realism is not a theory about how the world "really" is. - Reason: we could be wrong about all the details, and the realism can nevertheless be true.- Definition realism/Searle: the view that there is a way of being of the things that is logically independent of all representations, it does not say how things are.
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III 166
Realism/Searle: arguments against the existence of things are claims about the external reality like any other. They presuppose the realism just as others do. - The non-existence of things ((s) "out there") - would be a property of that representation-independent reality.
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III 191
External Realism/Searle: is a condition for understanding other hypotheses.
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III 169
Realism/Searle: says that there is an independent reality, but nothing about how it
is designed, no theory of language, no theory of representation, but ontological.
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III 193 ff
Realism: thesis: has no hypothesis, but conditions for any hypotheses - realism as part of the background.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-10-20