|Realism, philosophy: realism is a collective term for theories which, in principle, believe that it is possible for us to acquire knowledge about objects of the external world that is independent from us as perceptual subjects. A strong realism typically represents the thesis that it would make sense to even create hypotheses about basically unknowable objects. See also metaphysical realism, internal realism, universal realism, constructivism.|
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|Rorty I 305ff
Anti-Realist/Putnam/Rorty understands ancient and our modern theories not as two approximately correct description of a solid inventory, but he does not believe that our theory is better in relation to the same entities. But if our theory is merely our theory, we could instead use it just as well as the Neanderthals - PutnamVsAnti-realism: the problem is that for him truth is only useful as a theories subordinate term. But extension is inextricably linked with truth: x is then precisely part of the extension of a predicate F if "x is an F" is true. - Internal realism. (according to Rorty): position according to which we "mundane fact" that the use of language contributes to achieve our goals, to our satisfaction etc. It can be explained by the fact that "not the language but the speaker reflects the world in that they produce a symbolic representation of their environment"(Putnam): - By means of our conventions, we constitute the universe better than ever before. PutnamVsRealismus/PutnamVsRelativismus/Rorty: both assume one could simultaneously be both inside and outside the language.
Horwich I 389
Realism/Putnam: explains why theories tend to convergence. - Realism means that not language but speakers depict the world.
Horwich I 395 f
Realism/fact/Putnam: E.g. Story 1: a line can be divided into points - that is, into smaller and smaller segments - then there is the same relation "part of" between points and segments and segments and larger segments - Story 2: there are no points, but these are logical constructions. - "Hard core" -Realism: would say that there is a fact here that decides about it. - PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: "refined realism": 1 and 2 are equivalent descriptions.
Horwich I 398
Metaphysical Realism: if you cannot say, how the WORLD theory is independent, the talk of various descriptions (e.g. point or converging segment) becomes empty - that says Quine in ontological relativity.
Horwich I 404
PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: is doomed to a) to consider the logic either empirically (i.e. not merely revisable, as I believe it) but in the sense that it has no conventional component at all, or - b) He has the logic for a priori i.e. not explainable by the notion of convention.
Putnam I 78
Realism/Putnam: he must left it inexplicable that E.g. spacetime calculi predict observable phenomena correctly when there is no curved spacetime in reality. - What has prediction to do with truth then?
Realism: realistic conception of connectives ensures that a statement is not true solely because it follows any theory.
PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: faces infinitely many correspondences - endless possibilities how signs and things can correspond. - Problem: to choose the right, without a metaphysical access. ((S)> Loewenheim).
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994