Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Realism, philosophy: realism is a collective term for theories which, in principle, believe that it is possible for us to acquire knowledge about objects of the external world that is independent from us as perceptual subjects. A strong realism typically represents the thesis that it would make sense to even create hypotheses about basically unknowable objects. See also metaphysical realism, internal realism, universal realism, constructivism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Immanuel Kant on Realism - Dictionary of Arguments
Strawson V 230 Realism/KantVsLeibniz assumes truths about independent objects. Kant: we may only speak of terms instead. >Thing in itself/Kant, >Perception/Kant, >Knowledge/Kant; ((s) Cf. >Semantic ascent/Quine). - - - Stroud I 134 Realism/Kant: a) metaphysical realism: that things exist independently of us in the room - b) epistemic realism: contains something about our approach to things. Thesis: Perception: is directly and unproblematic - hence knowledge of external things (the outside world) is possible. Scandal/Kant: that the realism was never proved before. Stroud I 135 Moores hands/Kant/Stroud: Kant cannot complain that Moore would assume things only by belief itself. >Moore's hands. Stroud I 136 It is not about lack of generality. ((s) The proof is quite general (s.o. chapter 3). Stroud I 162 Def Transcendental Realism/Kant: understands the external things as something separate from the senses - KantVs: that leads to the empiricist idealism. Problem: we are aware of our representations but do not know whether they corresponds with something that exists. >Representations/Kant._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16