Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Realism, philosophy: realism is a collective term for theories which, in principle, believe that it is possible for us to acquire knowledge about objects of the external world that is independent from us as perceptual subjects. A strong realism typically represents the thesis that it would make sense to even create hypotheses about basically unknowable objects. See also metaphysical realism, internal realism, universal realism, constructivism.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
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Books on Amazon
I 45
VsRealism / Barrow: ignores the limitations of our mind - e.g. the limit of a sequence often has properties that no term of the sequence has - E.g. someone may be realist in terms of the existence of the muon, but hemust describe its properties pragmaticclly and anti-realistically - ((s)> theoretical entities).


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

B I
John D. Barrow
Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996

B II
John D. Barrow
Die Natur der Natur: Die philosophischen Ansätze der modernen Kosmologie Heidelberg 1993

B III
John D. Barrow
Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001


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> Counter arguments against Barrow
> Counter arguments in relation to Realism

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-10-17