|Reality, philosophy: it is controversial, which should be counted to reality, that is to say, the set of objects and states which occur in the world. Theories partially differ strongly regarding the definitions of facts and situations or the consideration of internal states of subjects. Thus, a situation can be described in many ways, whereby very different assumptions about the involved objects and relations come into play. See also ontology, realism, recognition, epistemology, constructivism, fact, situations, internal/external, totality, relations, simulation.|
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Reality/world/Quine: proximal theory (nerve endings): closed from the world, which is perhaps quite different - ultimate source of evidence: irritation - DavidsonVsQuine. Cartesian separation; gap - also separation of scheme and content - DavidsonvsDescartes / DavidsonVsQuine: once one is decided to close that gap, one can not specify what the evidence actually was evidence for.
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Rorty VI 63 ff
World/Putnam/Goodman (VsWilliams)/Rorty: there is no real suchness of the world. Davidson: the contribution that the world is contributing is inseparable from the part we contribute ourselves.
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000