Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Radical interpretation, philosophy: is an expression for a family of thought experiments, which has the object of the translation of a completely foreign language into the language of the interpreter, which the interpreter does not understand at all. See also translation, indeterminacy, Gavagai.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
VI 64
String of Symbols/Chain/Radical Interpretation/RI/Quine: recurring segments can be treated as words.
V 73
Radical interpretation/RI/Quine: also for them a question answer game is indispensable.
V 74
The field researcher has to ask for approval. (>Gavagai). Criterion for consent: the willingness to express an observation sentence of one's own accord.
>Observation Sentence/Quine
XII 27
Object/Translation/Indefiniteness/Expression Conditions/Language Learning/Radical Interpretation/Quine: the expression conditions are not sufficient to be able to say with certainty what a speaker of a foreign language regards as objects.
>Language/Quine
Problem: how can assertions of existence (theorems of existence) ever be empirically invalidated?
Solution: the knowledge of the conditions of utterance does not ensure the reference to the subject, but it does help to clarify what serves as empirical confirmation of the truth of the whole sentence.
XII 28
We then project our own acceptance of objects onto the indigenous language.
We can be sure that the assumed object is an observed object in the sense that the amplified stimuli emanate quite directly from it.
>Language Learning/Quine

Language Learning/Object/Reference/Quine: Phases:
1. "Mum", "water" etc. are subsequently recognized as names of recurring objects
2. Occurrence individuates terms (general term): true concept of objects. "Which one of them"
3. Demonstrative singular term: Example "this apple". Problem: may not name anything: may be a dummy.
N.B.: the dummy is also an observable spatial temporal object.
4. Attributive combination of two general terms: new: now we can create general terms that do not apply to anything: Example "blue apple", "square circle".
XII 29
N.B.: but if they are true, the items in question are nothing new.
5. New types of objects, new understanding: compound terms by comparatives: e.g. "smaller than this spot":
While the non-existence of observable blue apples means the non-existence of blue apples at all. I.e. we have theoretical terms.
N.B.: these are only gradual differences of terms for observable objects.
XII 62
Def Original Translation/Terminology/Quine/Spohn: = radical interpretation (RI).
>Translation/Quine


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-05-28
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