Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
IV 37
Holism/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Quine represents a meaning holism (MH) - but supposedly also a confirmation holism (CH) - which equals the >Quine-Duhem thesis. - (>Two Dogmas: phrases do not stand individually before the Tribunal).
IV 39f
PragmatismVsRealism - QuineVsReductionism: verification conditions not analytically included in statements. - Confirmation holism/Fodor/Lepore: does not have to be a pragmatist, can also be a realist - compatible with Quine-Duhem thesis (sentences not individually verifiable) - Confirmation not a linguistic matter, but the way the world is (Quine pro realism). - Quine: a priori equivalent to the semantic. - Quine pro verificationism: sentence meaning: method of verification. - Quine-Duhem thesis: highly consistent with realism - Quine-Duhem thesis: a) any statement can be maintained if appropriate auxiliary hypotheses are provided - b) the requirement that evidence must be a posteriori - Quine-Duhem thesis/Fodor/Lepore: can also be read: as a) QuineVsCarnap: Vs localism of confirmation - b) QuineVsCarnap: Vs localism of meaning.
IV 2189
Network/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: the only fixed nodes are the observational concepts.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-08-25
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