|Cross-world identity, philosophy: is an expression for the problem of how to determine the identity of an object by accepting properties that it does not have in the actual world. Is it meaningful to say that Paul could have been taller in a possible world than he actually is, or would Paul be another individual then? See also possible worlds, modal realism, counterpart theory, counterpart relation, counterparts, telescope theory, centered worlds._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.|
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Cross world identity/Stalnaker: need not be transitive. - E.g. Ship of Theseus, E.g. Statue and clay: here it is controversial whether statements about the cross world identitiy are true. - 1) conceptual framework - 2) as actualists we are not talking literally about sets of individuals in other possible world - instead: sets of representatives - we need to separate the individual from its way of being.
Cross world identity/Haecceitismus/StalnakerVsSalmon, Nathan: We do not need absolute identity to define our real world-relative identity - for actualism all statements are made from the perspective of a possible world - then there is no perspective beyond all possible worlds.
Def identity/Possible world-relative/Stalnaker: identity is always the binary relation whose extension in every possible world w is the set of pairs so that d is in the range of w.
((s) cross orld identity/(s): each is formulated in a possible worlds)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003