Dictionary of Arguments

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Quasi-Universals, philosophy: quasi-Universal is an expression by D.M. Armstrong (Armstrong, “What is a Law of Nature?”, Cambridge, 1983, p. 79ff) for an artificial extension of a universal by adding an additional determination. E.g. animal or when thinking, then robot. See also universalism, nominalism, realism, extension.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
III 79/80
Quasi-universals/ particulars / Armstrong: you could say, "true" particulars do not have temporal parts - then it is necessary to introduce properties that have a time index: Quasi-U -> partic. without temporal parts: continuant
III 100
Def Quasi-Universals/Armstrong: e.g. fruit in Smith s Garden: apple or banana, then elephant or cherry then nothing ... or ... - must be introduced so that laws of nature can remain relations between universals - a qu.u. is no u. because of reference to individual cases - no particular because repeatable - need for a law - it would satify Aristotle s "predicable of many things."


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-12-10
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