|Quantification: is a function within the predicate logic, in which a property is attributed to an object yet to be determined. A) Existence quantification e.g. (Ex) (Fx) "At least one object x is F". It is assumed that the object denoted by x exists. B) Universal quantification (notation (x) ...) "For all x applies ...". Both forms of quantification can be negated, covering most of the everyday cases. In addition, a subject domain must be chosen, within which the statements that result from the insertion of objects are meaningful. See also existence, non-existence, existence assumption, existence predicate, universal quantification, existence quantification, domains, opacity, intensional objects._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Grover, D. L. on Quantification - Dictionary of Arguments
Horwich I 365
Quantificatorial pronouns/Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB: quantificatorial pronouns do not allow us to introduce new topics, new attributions, new properties, new relations, nor new terms. N.B.: the novelty is a logical first: just as e.g. we cannot say expressions without "or" that we can say with "or". Prosentences: prosentences are just as indispensable in this sense. Similar: the formation of the opposite of sentences is not possible without "it is not true that"._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
|Grover, D. L.
Gro I D. Grover, A Prosentential Theory of Thruth, Princeton New Jersey 1992
D. L. Grover, J L. Camp, N. D. Belnap
Philosophical Studies 27 (1) 73 – 125 (1975)
See external reference in the individual contributions.
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994