|Qualities, philosophy: quality is an expression of the nature of objects or the form of properties. Today, it is no longer understood as a category but rather as the sum of the distinguishing features of an object. Properties of the objects like their size, mass, etc. count as objective or primary qualities, subjective (secondary) qualities are properties which are settled in the subject, e.g. color. See also quantities, qualia, subjectivity, objectivity, properties, features._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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|Horwich I 409
Primary qualities/Locke: E.g. length, size, shape - secondary: e.g. color. - secondary quality/Locke: do not resemble our ideas directly - Putnam thesis: Kant has that what Locke said about secondary extended to primary - Field: many say that today because the imaging theory is dead. - FieldVsPicture theory. - Locke color is a force to affect us. - Putnam: this also applies to size, charge, mass,...etc. - Putnam: even extends this to properties of sensations - but this force is not a noumenon, but the world itself (= Vs correspondence theory - (s): forces instead of objects). Problem: if electrons do not exist as noumena, they do not exist at all.
Qualities/Locke: secondary are founded in primary: the objects have the power to affect us by the length, size, mass, etc. of the corpuscles - otherwise bare facts. - "Things for us"/Putnam/Field: according to the limits of scientific research.
I.e. shape, etc. are only dispo, we will never represent the last properties, so and so to appear - we will never represent the last properties - FieldVsPutnam: that can never be proven._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994