|Qualia, philosophy: qualia are the sensory-like correspondences to properties perceived on external objects or processes. Problems arise in connection with the explanation of their origin and their comparability between individuals. See also phenomena, sensory perception, sensations, perceptions, stimuli, qualities, subjectivity, intersubjectivity, objectivity, inverted spectra, consciousness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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Qualia/Searle: qualia is what you cannot have without feeling anything.
No qualia are: beliefs and other intentional states. You can have it without a certain feeling connected to them.
The supposed problem is now: how can functionalism explain Qualia? It cannot do it because it is tailored to a completely different subject area: it is about attributions from the point of view of the third person.
Qualia/reduction/reductionism/Searle: You cannot trace back intentional content (or pain, or qualia) to something else, because if you could, these things would be something else, but they are nothing else.
FodorVs: "in order that an intentional reference is real, it must in reality be something else".
Chalmers I 258
Disappearing Qualia/fading qualia/Searle: (Searle (1992)): E.g. suppose that in your own brain, more and more silicon chips are being installed and you notice how your qualia is dwindling and you want to write "I'm becoming blind!" But you hear yourself say "I see a red object before me".
Chalmers: the system might believe that something is wrong about itself. But only if the physical changes cause a magical interaction.
Chalmers: It is much more likely that the qualia will not disappear when replacing neurons with silicone chips._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996
Constructing the World Oxford 2014