|Protocol sentence, philosophy of science: A protocol sentence is a sentence that documents an observation together with the place and time, as well as (eventually) the observation facilities and experimental conditions used. Problems arise in connection with differences in relation to the possible subject domain and the terms used when different theories or theory extensions are applied. Other descriptions are basic or observational sentences. See also theory-ladenness of meaning, empiricism, observation sentence, observation language, theoretical entities, theoretical terms._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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Protocol sentence/Hempel : compared to them even singular assertions have the character of hypotheses.
It follows : CarnapVsTractatus: truth/falsity of all statements can no longer be defined by reference to the truth of certain basic statements (because they are indeed hypotheses) - the (significance criterion is too narrow) -> also protocol sentences are no longer unassailable.
Schlick: not completely without basic sentences , otherwise > relativism.
SchlickVsCarnap/VsNeurath: the thesis that a statement is true if it is proven by protocol sentences sufficiently leads to absurd results, if the idea is absolutely true protocol sentences are declined - there are obviously many different systems of protocol sentences - by Carnap and Neurath each of these different, incompatible systems were true.
Carnap: to bring forth true protocol sentences we learn through conditioning: meters properly read , etc.
In the new form of Carnap's theory protocol sentences are even more radically stripped off their base character: they lose their irrefutability - Popper: statements of all forms may occur as protocol sentences.
In the end they are superfluous._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
I Hempel Zur Wahrheitstheorie des logischen Positivismus aus Wahrheitsheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk Frankfurt/M 1996
II Hempel Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums aus Sinnreich (Hg) Philosophie der idealen Sprache, München 1982
II (b) Hempel Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung (1951) aus Sinnreich (Hg) Philosophie der idealen Sprache, München 1982