|Propositional knowledge, philosophy: the knowledge of whether certain propositions are true or false in contrast to a knowledge-how or possessing an ability. A problem with propositional knowledge are indexical theorems because the determination of the truth value (true or false) is context-dependent and situation-dependent here. See also propositions, opacity, example of the two omniscient Gods.|
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|EMD II 69ff
Propositional Knowledge/Meaning Theory/Dummett: even representation of a practical ability is propositional knowledge.
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Dum III 62f
Knowledge/Dummett: that the murderer is on the roof, is not knowledge-who. - All predictive knowledge is based on propositional knowledge, because all theoretical knowledge is propositional - attribution of knowledge never grasps the whole knowledge of the subject - difference: to know the truth of a sentence/knowledge of the corresponding proposition ((s) fact) - E.g. "The earth is moving is true" is not the knowledge that the earth rotates. - Reason: there is also simple translation knowledge: the Earth moves = "la terra si muove".
Language/Propositional Knowledge/Dummett: usually little difference between knowledge of the P and knowledge of the truth of the sentence - but pk not sufficient for language proficiency - pk not sufficient for word understanding - knowledge of a single proposition not sufficient for understanding of words. - ((s) The word must be able to appear in several contexts.) - ((s) That is the converse to the substitution principle.)
Propositional Knowledge/Dummett - necessary to explain what the knowledge of the meaning consists of - knowledge that ... "the earth moves".
But also the proposition as such cannot play a role in the explanation of understanding (circular).
Understanding/Meaning/Propositional Knowledge: E.g. Kripke: "horses are called horses": those who know how to use "being called" must know that the sentence is true, even if he does not know what horses are - however, then he would not know what truth is expressed by this - he does not know the proposition, he has no propositional knowledge - Understanding: not only knowledge that a sentence is true, but knowledge of the proposition - (but not necessary for knowing the truth).
Meaning theory/Dummett: the sense of it to show the correct derivation of consciousness of a truth.
Davidson: from capturing the axioms.
Special case: "Homer denotes Homer": here one has to know that Homer refers to something.
DummettVs: not in order to know the meaning of "Homer" in our language.
Propositional Knowledge/DummettVsDavidson: 1) those who do not know what "the Earth" means learn something from the postulate "the Earth denotes the Earth": they learn that "the Earth" is a singular term. - But for meaning it is not sufficient to say that this is an axiom of English. - You need knowledge of the proposition.
Propositional Knowledge/Dummett: logical form: "X knows that b is F" or "X knows that the Gs are F" - here the subject of the that-sentence stands within the opaque context of the that-sentence itself.
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989