Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Propositional content, philosophy: The propositional content of a statement is what can be called true or false when the meaning is clear. The problem is how the situation and context can be made clear in the evaluation. Truth values cannot be attributed to any expressions below the sentence level. However, they have the potential to change the truth value of the whole sentence of which they are part. The following expressions correspond in this respect to the logical "and" - although, nevertheless, because, however, nonetheless. See also propositions, propositional attitudes, god example, identity conditions, opacity, content, translation.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data

Books on Amazon
I 215
Propositional content/Brandom: from social structures that transmit it, fundamental representational contents - (s) what is considered to be correct perception is socially regulated by standards.
I 217
Auxiliary hypotheses are different from person to person.
I 218
Access: to pragmatics. Normativally - to semantics: inferentially - to the interaction between conceptual contents: social.
I 236
Propositional content/Field/Brandom: two-staged: 1) belief in Mentalese, 2) meaning in public language.
I 327
Maths propositional content: without empiricism.
I 240
Propositional content/Brandom: (the believable) shall be distinguished by the pragmatic property of assertibility.
I 254
Definition propositional content: that which is expressed by performances and which determines the specific characteristics of their significance within the genus of asserting.
I 402
Propositional content: role as premises - starts with the concept of truth instead of inference - Definition action: make something true.
I 473
Propositional content/Brandom: Thesis: cannot play a fundamental explanatory role - is parasitic to the expressive role! - it is about the act of asserting and not about what is asserted.
I 873
Content/Brandom: propositional and other conceptual contents with which the behavior of the system is to be measured, cannot be justified with this behavior itself.
I 897
Propositional content/Brandom: what we mean depends on the actual circumstances, even if we do not know what they are. This is the perspective character of propositional content - hence the externalism begins at home: The contents of external definitions depend on their actions and of the truth of that which they make an assertion about.
II 207
Propositional content/Brandom: always also representational - propositional content can be reflected on in concepts of truth or reasons - "aboutness", "about" is not necessary in addition to representation - but propositional content must be able to be characterized non-representationally.
II 263
Objectivity/Brandom: of the propositional content: the objectivity (fact) says nothing about who could reasonably assert something - and such facts would even exist without living beings - this objectivity is a characteristic that we can make understandable as a structure of the definitions and authorisations - every community that recognizes definition and authorization as a normative status can recognize propositional content that are objective in this sense.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-10-24