Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

Home Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

Prosentential Theory, philosophy: the prosentential theory is a variant of the theory of truth presented by D.L. Grover, J. Camp and N. Belnap (“A prosentential theory of truth, Philosophical Studies”, 27, 73-124, 1975). Instead of the truth predicate "true", a whole sentence "that is true" is accepted, through which a questionable sentence could be supplemented theoretically in order to reaffirm its truth. The decisive point here is that in this way truth is not attributed as a property of sentences. See also redundancy theory, theory of truth, paratactic analysis, deflationism, inflationism, disquotationalism.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data

Grover, D. L. on Prosentential Theory - Dictionary of Arguments

Horwich I 315
Prosentential Theory/Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB/Grover: (modification of Ramsey's approach) Thesis: if we enrich everyday language slightly with propositional quantification (quantification over propositions), then we can express everything without a T-predicate ( "true") that we can express with it. See T-predicate, truth predicate.
I 324
Prosentential Theory/CGB: Variables: do not need to be connected with predicates in pro-sentence.
 - Everyday Language: already has pro-sentences - E.g. "it is true", "that's true" - relative pronoun: only with individual variables - not with propositional variables (they have sentence position) - solution: cross-reference - then a variable in the pro-sentence does not have to be connected to a verb.
I 325
True/Ramsey: does not have to attribute a property - CGB: true may be a fragment of the pro-sentence.
I 334
Prosentential/CGB: Thesis: we want to say in the spirit of Ramsey that all speech about the truth can be understood so that it only involves the prosentential use of "that's true".
I 349
Pro-Sentence/CGB: must not be split up - (to take "the" as anaphora - otherwise also "is true" alone and then no longer referring, but characterizing (property-attributing CGBVs).
I 351
True: becomes characterizing when "they" is construed as an independent pronoun (traditional, non-anaphoric).
I 354
Pro-Sentence: never refers to a proposition (as object of belief).
ad I 352
(Pro-Sentence/CGB/(s): normally has no assertive force). See assertive force.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Grover, D. L.

Gro I D. Grover, A Prosentential Theory of Thruth, Princeton New Jersey 1992

D. L. Grover, J L. Camp, N. D. Belnap
Philosophical Studies 27 (1) 73 – 125 (1975)

See external reference in the individual contributions.
Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Send Link
> Counter arguments in relation to Prosentential Theory

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Y   Z  

Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2021-05-15
Legal Notice   Contact   Data protection declaration