Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Prosentential Theory, philosophy: the prosentential theory is a variant of the theory of truth presented by D.L. Grover, J. Camp and N. Belnap (“A prosentential theory of truth, Philosophical Studies”, 27, 73-124, 1975). Instead of the truth predicate "true", a whole sentence "that is true" is accepted, through which a questionable sentence could be supplemented theoretically in order to reaffirm its truth. The decisive point here is that in this way truth is not attributed as a property of sentences. See also redundancy theory, theory of truth, paratactic analysis, deflationism, inflationism, disquotationalism.
 
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Horwich I 315
Prosentential Theory/Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB: (modification of Ramsey's approach) Thesis: if we enrich everyday language slightly with propositional quantification (quantification over propositions), then we can express everything without a T predicate ( "true") that we can express with it.
I 324
Prosentential Theory/CGB: Variables: do not need to be connected with predicates in pro-sentence.
 - Everyday Language: already has pro-sentences - E.g. "it is true", "that's true" - relative pronoun: only with individual variables - not with propositional variables (they have sentence position) - solution: cross-reference - then a variable in the pro-sentence does not have to be connected to a verb.
I 325
True/Ramsey: does not have to attribute a property - CGB: true may be a fragment of the pro-sentence.
I 334
Prosentential/CGB: Thesis: we want to say in the spirit of Ramsey that all speech about the truth can be understood so that it only involves the prosentential use of "that's true".
I 349
Pro-Sentence/CGB: must not be split up - (to take "the" as anaphora - otherwise also "is true" alone and then no longer referring, but characterizing (property-attributing CGBVs).
I 351
True: becomes characterizing when "they" is construed as an independent pronoun (traditional, non-anaphoric).
I 354
Pro-Sentence: never refers to a proposition (as object of belief).
ad I 352
(Pro-Sentence/CGB/(s): normally has no assertive force).
Grover, D. L.

Gro I D. Grover A Prosentential Theory of Thruth Princeton New Jersey 1992

Kamp/Grover/Belnap
D.L.Grover, J.L.Kamp, N.D. Belnap
Philosophical Studies 27 (1) 73 – 125 (1975)

See external reference in the individual contributions.
Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-25