Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Propositional attitudes, philosophy: A propositional attitude is the attitude of a person in relation to an object, often expressed in the form of a that-clause. Paul, for example, believes that Elmar believes the same as himself. For propositional attitudes, special identity conditions apply because one has to take into account what is known to the person and what language use they have. See also propositions, identity conditions, opacity.
 
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I 250ff
Purely indicative unambiguous (substitutability of identity) not: Tullius was a Roman is trochaic - E.g. tax auditor/Director -> propositional attitude - Expression in quotation marks is not purely indicative - ambiguous reference - every truth function is denotation transparent.
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I 263
Opacity: not belief is opaque, but that (Kronecker E.g.)
Opaque context: non-denoting function - Frege: Name of a thought, name of a property, name of an individual concept - Russell: propositional attitude.
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I 367
Propositional attitude: The object can only be a timeless sentence.
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I 372
Objects of the propositional attitude are eliminated: Thomas believes (Cicero has): no longer form Fab a = Thomas, b = () - but: Fa where F is a complex expression - does not believe term anymore, but operator.
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I 377
Direct speech: like birdsong - also acting performance, is propositional attitude.
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II 153 f
Propositional attitude/Quine: remain intact - But not de re.
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X 56
Propositional attitude/: 1) some authors: that-sentence name for proposition, then entity. - QuineVs: Objects of desire should be no entity - 2) Others: formation rule that turns 2-digit predicates believes+sentence into one-digit predicate by the interposition of that: believes that y - 3) believes that new category "attitude expression", then BR, which turns EA + sentence into a one-digit predicate: believes that Darwin was wrong -predicates: 2 digits: believes - 1 digit: believes that Darwin was wrong-/(s) rear position is satisfied.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-25