|Propositional attitudes, philosophy: A propositional attitude is the attitude of a person in relation to an object, often expressed in the form of a that-clause. Paul, for example, believes that Elmar believes the same as himself. For propositional attitudes, special identity conditions apply because one has to take into account what is known to the person and what language use they have. See also propositions, identity conditions, opacity.|
Books on Amazon
Purely indicative unambiguous (substitutability of identity) not: Tullius was a Roman is trochaic - E.g. tax auditor/Director -> propositional attitude - Expression in quotation marks is not purely indicative - ambiguous reference - every truth function is denotation transparent.
Opacity: not belief is opaque, but that (Kronecker E.g.)
Opaque context: non-denoting function - Frege: Name of a thought, name of a property, name of an individual concept - Russell: propositional attitude.
Propositional attitude: The object can only be a timeless sentence.
Objects of the propositional attitude are eliminated: Thomas believes (Cicero has): no longer form Fab a = Thomas, b = () - but: Fa where F is a complex expression - does not believe term anymore, but operator.
Direct speech: like birdsong - also acting performance, is propositional attitude.
II 153 f
Propositional attitude/Quine: remain intact - But not de re.
Propositional attitude/: 1) some authors: that-sentence name for proposition, then entity. - QuineVs: Objects of desire should be no entity - 2) Others: formation rule that turns 2-digit predicates believes+sentence into one-digit predicate by the interposition of that: believes that y - 3) believes that new category "attitude expression", then BR, which turns EA + sentence into a one-digit predicate: believes that Darwin was wrong -predicates: 2 digits: believes - 1 digit: believes that Darwin was wrong-/(s) rear position is satisfied.
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003