Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Propositional attitudes, philosophy: A propositional attitude is the attitude of a person in relation to an object, often expressed in the form of a that-clause. Paul, for example, believes that Elmar believes the same as himself. For propositional attitudes, special identity conditions apply because one has to take into account what is known to the person and what language use they have. See also propositions, identity conditions, opacity.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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I 20
A suggestion boils down to interpret the remainder of the sentence after "believes" as a complex adverb.
DavidsonVs: no human being has any idea how the meanings of the individual words could be derived from them. But we obviously understand the sentences because we understand the contained words.
I 22
If the "contents" of the propositional attitudes were the meanings, new, very long words would have to be learned, which often occur only once. Since, however, each statement can appear as a content sentence, its number is infinite and therefore cannot be learned.
I 104
Fodor: inner "solipsist" states that determine what is meant. DavidsonVsFodor: But such conditions do not exist at all, which is obvious: the very general characteristics for porcupines, e.g. "Has four paws, and spines," etc. are as dependent on the natural history of the acquisition of these words as the words "porcupine" and "short-beaked echidna".
II 127
Propositional attitudes are individuated through public objects - beliefs have causes, no private objects (with privileged access, for example). - (> Externalism).
Avr I 102f
Rationality/Davidson: is what we need to understand propositional attitudes, not for physics - ((s) = reason).
Dav I 22
Propositional attitude/content/meaning/Davidson: if the "contents" of the propositional attitudes were the meanings, we would always have to learn new, very long words, which often occur only once.
I 23
Propositional attitude/belief/reference/content/Davidson: according to that there is no alternative to the concept of belief sentences as relational sentences. Thus, one must consider the content sentence "The diamond Kohinoor is one of the crown jewels" together with "that" as a singular term.
I 39
Propositional attitudes/object/content/belief/desire/Brentano: no internal object different from the outer object - ((s) Davidson, actually, also Vs "inner objects" - but: DavidsonVsBrentano: Problem with objects that do not exist - Solution/Davidson/(s): Learning history secures word meaning without reference - Brentano Thesis: Intentionality irreducible to brain states.
Propositional attitudes/Davidson: are not subjective - access to other minds is guaranteed by the mechanism of language comprehension. - One must be able to come from the observed behavior to the attitudes, because language and thought are interpretable.
II 127
Propositional attitudes/Davidson: are individuated via public objects - beliefs have causes, no private objects - (externalism) - no representation - predicate "x believes that p": relation between speaker and an utterance of the interpreter.

D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-24