|Propositional attitudes, philosophy: A propositional attitude is the attitude of a person in relation to an object, often expressed in the form of a that-clause. Paul, for example, believes that Elmar believes the same as himself. For propositional attitudes, special identity conditions apply because one has to take into account what is known to the person and what language use they have. See also propositions, identity conditions, opacity.|
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Propositional attitudes/attribution/ambiguity/Cresswell: 1. Thesis: sentences with propositional attitude are ambiguous - 2. Thesis: the ambiguity is located in the word "that" - that is, the ambiguity is not located in the attitude verb or somewhere in the complement sentence.
Propositional Attitude/that-sentence/ambiguity/Cresswell: this is always about whether "that" is applied to the whole following sentence, or to its parts (the references of the individual parts). The ambiguity lies not in a peculiarity of faith.
Object/propositional attitude/Cresswell: a) as a question of the meaning of the that-sentence. This is what this book is all about - b) Question, what makes the sentence true. Answer: that (1) is true, because Ambrose expresses a certain sentence- object: is then the sentence which Ambrose actually utters - that may have been quite different sentences. In any case, the sentence will represent that it will rain. - Definition object: is then a representation. - ((s) representation/(s): comes into play because it could have been different sentences.) Problem: the object of an attribution of propositional attitudes cannot be the meaning because we can understand it without knowing if it was exactly this sentence.
Definition object/attitude/propositional attitude/Terminology/Cresswell: I call the object of the attitude the sentence that is actually uttered. Fodor is concerned with objects. - Definition content: be the meaning of the that-sentence - it is about contents in this book - different objects (sentences) can have the same content.
Iterated propositional attitudes/Cresswell: E.g. Natasha believes that Mortimer believes ... - no problem: if "that" is applied to entire sentences (that0) - (similar to the double negation). - Problem: if the that is applied to individual structures - E.g. (see above) (7 + 5) + 2 - ((s) misleading) - no problem: if the + is a function of numbers (i.e. the referent of the digits) Problem: if + should operate on structures (= sense of numeric expressions).
Object/propositional attitude/Cresswell: the objects are not determined by the content. That is, that an explanation of action by desire/faith could sometimes be undefined - content: is simply not sufficient for a determination of the object.
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984