|Propositions, philosophy: propositions are defined as the meanings of sentences, whereby a sentence is interpreted as a character string, which must still be interpreted in relation to a situation or a speaker. E.g. “I am hungry” has a different meaning from the mouth of each new speaker. On the other hand, the sentence “I am hungry” from the mouth of the speaker, who first expressed the German sentence, has the same meaning as the German sentence uttered by him. See also meaning, propositional attitudes, identity conditions, opacity, utterances, sentences.|
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Proposition/Structure/Possible world/Stalnaker: propositions are highly structured, possible worlds are not - the structures that exist between propositions, do not exist like that between possible worlds - propositions can be stronger or weaker - possible worlds cannot - a minimum theory of propositions and possible worlds needs only the structures of propositions, not of possible worlds.
Proposition/Stalnaker: is made up of individuals and properties - sentence/Stalnaker: is made up of names and predicates.
Understanding/Stalnaker: a proposition cannot be understood like a sentence, because it is already the content.
Def Proposition/Stalnaker: is no more than a sub-region, or subset of possible worlds - Def assertion: asserting a proposition is nothing else than to locate the real world in this subset - Def true-relative-to-x: to say, a Proposition is true relative to a possible world x means that the possible world x is in the subset (of possible worlds) that constitutes the proposition - Def true simpliciter: is to say that the real world is in this subset (of possible worlds that constitute the proposition) - Proposition: is identified with its truth conditions.
Secondary Proposition/Two-dimensional semantics/Chalmers/Stalnaker: ("fx"): based on the real world - primary: ("fp") based on the particular world in which the statement is made - logical form: Def fp: logical Form: fx(y) = f(x,y) and fp(x) = f(x,x) or equivalent: fp(x) = fx(x).
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003