Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Propositions, philosophy: propositions are defined as the meanings of sentences, whereby a sentence is interpreted as a character string, which must still be interpreted in relation to a situation or a speaker. E.g. “I am hungry” has a different meaning from the mouth of each new speaker. On the other hand, the sentence “I am hungry” from the mouth of the speaker, who first expressed the German sentence, has the same meaning as the German sentence uttered by him. See also meaning, propositional attitudes, identity conditions, opacity, utterances, sentences.
 
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II 274
E.g. Heimson/Perry/Searle: tightening: Heimson was Humes doppelganger on the twin earth, ecxcept for the micro-structure - the sentence has in both cases the same Fregean sense - but the propositions must be different because they have different truth values - so Fregean sense is not enough to determine which proposition is expressed - it cannot explain the indexicality - Kaplan: therefore different theory of propositions: "direct reference", "singular propositions": here the proposition is not the intentional content in the head of the speaker, but it has to contain the real object - SearleVs> see self-reference.
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V 144
SearleVsFrege: missed the distinction between sense and proposition -
Proposition/Searle: circumstances are necessary in addition to the terms.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983


> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Propositions



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-27