Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Propositions, philosophy: propositions are defined as the meanings of sentences, whereby a sentence is interpreted as a character string, which must still be interpreted in relation to a situation or a speaker. E.g. “I am hungry” has a different meaning from the mouth of each new speaker. On the other hand, the sentence “I am hungry” from the mouth of the speaker, who first expressed the German sentence, has the same meaning as the German sentence uttered by him. See also meaning, propositional attitudes, identity conditions, opacity, utterances, sentences.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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Graeser I 129
SchifferVsPropositions: are no language-independent contents of corresponding settings: they could not even perceive this function. SchifferVsRepresentation: the contents of sentences in question cannot be representations, for example, in a language of thought. Belief/Schiffer: Vs belief as a relation - Mean/SchifferVsDavidson: if there can neither be a sentence-oriented nor a non-sentence-oriented analysis of meaning, then also the possibility of conception of judgmental settings as relations collapses. Graeser: thus we lose the ground under our feet.
Schiffer I ~ XVII
SchifferVsPropositions/late: should contain E.g. dog property - Intention-based semantics/Grice: requires, however, that propositions are neural sentences - problem: no truth conditions in mentalese.
I 14
Propositions: have their truth values ​​significantly. - ((s) because they are not public, the truth values are not attributed to the communication) - ((s) but they are also not in mentalese) - phrases/expressions: have their truth values ​​contingently - (in public speech or in mentalese) - Proposition: content itself, is not representation but is represented.
I 49f
Propositions/Belief object/relation theory/SchifferVsPropositions: always requires natural kind terms - even substitution is not compatible with any propositional theory - propositional theory says that "p" is a real object variable - 2. that propositions are their values ​​- Proposition: abstract, not in space and time - yet real concrete components. - E.g. Capitol in "The Capitol is in NY" - but only if fine-grained (as a complex of individuals and properties) - they are objective and mind-independent as opposed to pain and mental representations.
"Thought"/Frege: = Proposition - also the components and characteristics of propositions are abstract and language independent: e.g. the whiteness of snow - Problem: VsPropositions: ontological commitment to Platonism.
I 51
SchifferVsPropositions: are superfluous such as facts and features - E.g. Michele has the property to be funny (or the fact that funny ...) - doubling - fine grained. Complexes that include individuals as a structure as components and properties. - E.g. Situation Semantics/Barwise/Perry, Lewis 1970a - (grainy: set of) - Problem: from compositionality for reference follows that the proposition "snow is white" is necessarily true if snow is white - different: as sets of possible worlds propositions include their speakers not as components.
I 52
Proposition: different: if = functions of possible worlds on truth values, then speakers not as components - then maybe partial functions that maps a possible world onto the truth, iff snow is white - Problem: unstructured propositions (functions) cause necessary equivalent propositions to be identical - then the problem of logical omniscience follows - solution: structured (fine-grained) entities: contain objects, properties, operators, which they determine.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-10-20