# Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Propositions, philosophy: propositions are defined as the meanings of sentences, whereby a sentence is interpreted as a character string, which must still be interpreted in relation to a situation or a speaker. E.g. “I am hungry” has a different meaning from the mouth of each new speaker. On the other hand, the sentence “I am hungry” from the mouth of the speaker, who first expressed the German sentence, has the same meaning as the German sentence uttered by him. See also meaning, propositional attitudes, identity conditions, opacity, utterances, sentences.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Bertrand Russell on Propositions - Dictionary of Arguments

Horwich I 54
Proposition/Russell: is a complex entity with components: E.g. Smith is taller than Brown: Smith, Brown, the relation taller than - E.g. Brown is smaller than Smith: is therefore equivalent, but is different in all three components! - Letter to Frege: the mountain literally appears in the proposition - Cartwright: thoughts/Frege: are not the same as Russell’s propositions - they do not contain their objects - ((s) ."...but their sense").
Horwich I 56
Proposition/Russell/Cartwright: how can a proposition be wrong if it consists of the components and the nature of their connection? - Solution/Russell: another quality - CartwrightVs: which had already been rejected.
Horwich I 59
Proposition/Principia Mathematica/Russell: φ x (requires function) - Propositional function: φ x^ - not ambiguous - the values ​​are all propositions of the form j x.
Horwich I 60
I.e. the symbol φ (φx^) must not express a proposition as does indeed, if a is a value for φ x^ - indeed j(jx^) must be a symbol that expresses nothing, it is pointless - (neither true nor false) - E.g. -the function- is a human is a human.
Horwich I 60f
Proposition/propositional function/Principia Mathematica/Russell: The symbol (x).j x shall always express the proposition φ x, i.e. the proposition that claims all values ​​for φ x^.
Horwich I 61
This proposition presupposes the function j x^, not just an ambiguous value of the function - the assertion of φ x, where x is not specified, is different from that which claims all values for φ x^, because the former is an ambiguous assertion, and the latter is not ambiguous in any sense. (1)

1. R. Cartwright, „A Neglected Theory of Truth“ , Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994
- - -
Russell I 125
Proposition/Function/Extensional/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: functions of propositions are always truth functions - a function can only occur in a proposition by means of its values. (see above ​​extensional) - consequence: all functions of functions are extensional. E.g. A believes p is not a function of p - (Tractatus 19-20) - ((s) VsRussell: (see above) > Waverley, functions are equivalent, but not identical, because George IV did not want to know if Scott = Scott - ((s) being believed is not a function of the believed object) - ((s)> extrinsic properties, extrinsic) - ((s)> Function of a function of higher level).

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Russell I
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

> Counter arguments against Russell
> Counter arguments in relation to Propositions

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2022-01-28