Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Propositions, philosophy: propositions are defined as the meanings of sentences, whereby a sentence is interpreted as a character string, which must still be interpreted in relation to a situation or a speaker. E.g. “I am hungry” has a different meaning from the mouth of each new speaker. On the other hand, the sentence “I am hungry” from the mouth of the speaker, who first expressed the German sentence, has the same meaning as the German sentence uttered by him. See also meaning, propositional attitudes, identity conditions, opacity, utterances, sentences.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
I 332
Sentence = Universal! - Value of the variable: Proposition (object) - remains in place even after singular term! - Proposition resists change the truth value - Proposition remains nameless in x0p.
Words denote - sentences do not! (No singular term)! - Nevertheless, a sentence has meaning: the singular terms formed by bracketing of the sentence (no proposition!).
I 343
Modal logic: Church/Frege: modal sentence = proposition.
I 347
Proposition here: completion of correct sentence to a timeless sentence - timeless sentence "The door is open": which door? this denotes nothing.
I 355
Vs Propositions: translations must also mean propositions. - Actually right proposition cannot be explored by behavior (Gavagai) - Proposition eliminated: synonymy indefinable - scientific truth indefinable (only within the theory) (>§16).
I 358
Proposition: no common meaning of translated sentences: indeterminacy of translation - propositions could all be quite different.
I 358
Proposition as bearers of truth: no reason why one should refer to timeless sentences and not to the sentences themselves.
Sentence: The door is open bracketing: needed to find out what the sentence expresses in a situation. - what could the speaker have said? (Propositions do not help there).
VII 109
Propositions/Quine: if anything, they should be regarded as names of statements.
VII 157
Proposition/Quine: in relation to sentences as attributes, in relation to open sentences - Proposition number of planets > 7 unequal Proposition 9 > 7.
X 32
Proposition/Object/Quine: If a sentence is supposed to be the name of a proposition (some writers pro, QuineVs), then the proposition is an object - then correct: p or not p for all propositions p - then p is here not even variable over object, and once scheme letter of sentences, but only variable - (no semantic ascent necessary).
XII 39
Sentence/Proposition/Propositional attitude/Translation/ChurchVsQuine: if sentence bears the meaning instead of the proposition, then problem: E.g. Edwin believes the German sentence S translate into English: a) leave sentence, b) reproduce in indirect speech in English: then both are not equivalent - QuineVsVs: admitted, but unclear concept of everyday language equivalence - Quine: still do not accept linguistic forms as objects of propositional attitudes: to artificial.

W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Propositions

> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX Datei
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-25