|Propositions, philosophy: propositions are defined as the meanings of sentences, whereby a sentence is interpreted as a character string, which must still be interpreted in relation to a situation or a speaker. E.g. “I am hungry” has a different meaning from the mouth of each new speaker. On the other hand, the sentence “I am hungry” from the mouth of the speaker, who first expressed the German sentence, has the same meaning as the German sentence uttered by him. See also meaning, propositional attitudes, identity conditions, opacity, utterances, sentences.|
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Propositions/Prior: are logical structures (i.e. no real objects), (facts and phrases not) - therefore propositions are language independent.
Proposition/fact/Prior: "Grass is not pink": complex sentence on grass, not sentence about "proposition" Grass is pink"".
Proposition/Prior: you cannot only think P, but also about P, but other form than about objects: E.g. "__ thinks that the proposition __ is absurd": because the second gap is not for name but a sentence.
"about"/Prior: belief-that, thinking-that: is never about propositions, but about what propositions are about. - "aboout" is systematically ambiguous, what it means depends on what kind of name or quasi-name (for example, numbers) follows it.
Propositions/Wittgenstein/Ramsey: no matter from what "order" are always truth functions of independent sentences.
Propositions/Prior: have only Pickwick's importance. (WittgensteinVsBroad: (W II 94), there is not a "special" meaning besides the "ordinary" B.) - Proposition/(Thoughts?)/Church: have the property, "to be the concept of truth or falsehood".
Proposition/Prior: when we speak of propositional identity, we are forced, to no longer see them as logical constructions. We need to treat them as real objects. (PriorVs).
Name/proposition/Prior: "the proposition that p" only apparent name.
Identity of propositions/Prior: no substantive equivalence
Objects of thought Oxford 1971
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003