Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

 
Propositions, philosophy: propositions are defined as the meanings of sentences, whereby a sentence is interpreted as a character string, which must still be interpreted in relation to a situation or a speaker. E.g. “I am hungry” has a different meaning from the mouth of each new speaker. On the other hand, the sentence “I am hungry” from the mouth of the speaker, who first expressed the German sentence, has the same meaning as the German sentence uttered by him. See also meaning, propositional attitudes, identity conditions, opacity, utterances, sentences.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
Frank I 396
Meaning/thought/PerryVsFrege: we must separate the meaning sharply from the thought- the thought is not a mental entity but corresponds to the informational content. - Meaning corresponds with the role of the words - the same role creates in every context another de re-proposition.
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I 409f
Proposition/PerryVsTradition: what is missing, is not a conceptual component, but an indexical. - New theory: a kind of proposition is individuated by an object and a part of the old proposition. - VsTradition: limiting the substitutability in quotations with propositional attitudes is not explained. - Tradition: E.g. Dean/Franks neighbor (identical, one and the same person): no variable but term. - Problem: "He" does not provide a concept but a variable. - Solution/Perry: "open proposition": with objects and a conceptual component: "de re" - then the "dean himself" is included and not only the term "Dean". - Then a substitution by "Frank's neighbor" is valid and a quantification meaningful. - Vs: de re does not solve the problem of mess in the supermarket (sugar trail) - (because of "I").
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I 455f
Proposition/extra sense//Perry: parabola E.g. early humans who can only eat carrots lying in front of them, are equipped with the ability to believe propositions (to collect and pick up carrots) - nothing happens, because the propositions do not say to humans that they even appear in it. - Castaneda: additional localization in space and time. - Vs: the king of France does not know that he is the King of France and whether the carrot is not in front of the editor of Soul - VsExtra-sense: does not help the thinker embedding himself into a network of mental states - people understand sentences but do not form beliefs. - List of extra senses for everyone: too long - Extra-sense "i" for everyone: validity by decree: solves the carrots problem but maims the language - rule: "I" stands for the user ": makes people to speak of themselves in the "third person": ""I"is doing this" - problem: for truth of such sentences one needs reference (reference), meaning ("user") is not enough - the same meaning cannot perform different references..


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Perr I
J. R. Perry
Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994


> Counter arguments against Perry
> Counter arguments in relation to Propositions

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-24